Something unexpected happened after Indian Operation Sindoor and Pakistan’s agile response through Operation Bunyan Marsus. The four-day skirmish left India red-faced despite its massive media onslaught, projecting the outcome as victory. President Trump took credit for the ceasefire, duly acknowledged by Pakistan, while an egotistic India still refuses to accept foreign interlocution. Then, on August 1, 2025, President Trump slapped a punitive 25% tariffs on India, letting Pakistan off with a relatively benign 19%. Earlier Trump had feted out Field Marshal Asim in the White House. He announced a massive trade deal with Pakistan on July 30.
Cumulatively, the cited developments bring Pakistan back into relevance, and business with the West Plus, re-hyphenate it with India, debunk the massive Indian propaganda to paint Pakistan as ‘Terroristan’, and open new vistas for Islamabad. However, this closeness with the US again, to some analysts, is at the cost of Pak-China friendship.
First Islamabad and Beijing. Two statements on August 1 — one from Foreign Office and the other from ISPR — clearly articulated the special nature of Pak-China friendship in context. Foreign Office spokesperson emphatically highlighted the decades-old strategic partnership with Beijing, notwithstanding Islamabad’s relations with other countries. And perhaps for the first time, GHQ celebrated the 98th founding anniversary of China’s People’s Liberation Army on August 1 with a dignified ceremony attended by high-ranking Chinese officials. Chinese Ambassador Jiang Zaidong was the chief guest.
The Middle Kingdom conducts its foreign relations in a very matured, measured and deliberate manner. One remembers being part of a delegation led by the Chairman Joint Chief of Staff Committee, wherein bilateral exercise between both air forces was being discussed. When Pakistan had to remove the US-supplied F-16s from the planned manoeuvres at some later hours, the Chinese Defence Minister, Mr Lee Quang Li was extremely conciliatory to address the embarrassment. Chinese relations do not come with geo-strategic caveats. They ostensibly believe in ‘harmony’ and are sensitive to other nations’ imperatives and compulsions. So, any closeness with the US is not, will not and should not come at the cost of Pak-China bilateralism, brotherhood and benevolence.
Second, the conduct of the Pak-US relations. Since partnership against communism in the US-led SEATO, CENTO, GWOT, Islamabad has traditionally remained closer to the US, providing back-channel support to the 1971 Sino-US détente. Pakistan’s military benefited particularly from the US hardware, doctrine and training. Our cantonments in Kharian, Multan and Gujranwala got infrastructure support from Washington. However, from geo-strategic partnership, Pakistan was later relegated to relative obscurity by Trump 1.0 and Biden Administrations, thanks partly to the pervasive Indian influence traditionally on the US policy apparatus.
Trump 2.0 is more transactional, upending the traditional US geo-strategic construct and hence the punitive tariffs on India, and favour with Pakistan. Pakistan has, reportedly, the fourth largest hydrocarbon reserves along its coast. It must have been the size of these reserves that sparked President Trump’s comment on X/Truth Social — “We are in the process of choosing the oil company that will lead this Partnership. Who knows, maybe they’ll [Pakistan] be selling Oil to India one day.”
This is an unsettling discovery for Pakistan/region and good business for the US energy giant ExxonMobil that ‘might’ bid for and undertake offshore drilling. Any US company doing exploration would automatically ensure security of the operation. The growing Pak-US counterterrorism cooperation and mutual alignment over Afghanistan are also likely to cement bilateral ties, with China benefitting from a secure regional environment. Under the last PTI government, ExxonMobil, then undertaking offshore exploration, was not allowed access to an additional area in Kekra field. Pakistan ‘expects’ ExxonMobil to come back as negotiations move forward.
More recently, Pakistan also inked an agreement to import US crude with first shipment expected in October. While earlier, Washington had refused to export LNG to Pakistan, given joint ventures between the US and Indian companies, implying Islamabad to go through New Delhi. Today the US Exim Bank is interested in providing capital to the stalled Reko Diq copper and gold mining project. American companies are mulling joint ventures with Pakistani firms to tap Pakistan’s mineral sector, with an estimated potential of $ 8trillion. And GB, KP and Balochistan have substantial deposits of rare earths. Additionally, Pakistan’s bitcoin policy also interests Trump personally. All this fits his economic outlook.
Third, Pakistan’s delicate diplomatic balancing. In a meeting with the Afghan acting Ambassador in Islamabad last year, Ambassador Sardar Ahmed Shakeeb mentioned that IEA leadership was very impressed with the way Pakistan handled its relations with America. As per an Indian analyst, Biswanath Bhattacharya, Islamabad has perfected ‘balancing contradictions so deftly that even gravity seems to look on in admiration’. Despite being tethered economically and strategically to China, Islamabad is able to carve an advantage from a transactional, mercurial and unpredictable Trump White House, under the overall environment of Sino-US hostility. From being a vanguard nation in the Chinese BRI through CPEC, Pakistan not only secured a deal for American oil investment, but it also earned public endorsement from President Trump.
In the last fiscal year, Pakistan’s exports to the US stood at $6 billion, against $2.4 billion worth of imports. The ensuing surplus of $3.7 billion was worrying for President Trump. However, Pakistan under the new 19% tariff is still at relative advantage, compared to India’s 25%, Bangladesh’s 20%, Iraq’s 35%, Vietnam’s 20% and 19% for Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia. Pakistan, in trade negotiations, secured duty-free access to over 4,100 American products.
Avoiding bloc politics, Pakistan’s diplomatic work endears it today to the world powers — China, the US and Russia — increasingly through its geo-strategic relevance, and gutsy and matured dealings with a bellicose and arrogant India. Islamabad’s foreign service understands that ‘survival and prosperity depend on cultivating relationships with all major players’. It has been able to balance the dictates of BRI/CPEC through increasing cooperation with the US on Afghanistan, counterterrorism, and now, potentially on minerals, oil and gas. The oil deal marks a watershed in exploiting Pakistan’s untapped hydrocarbons with American money and technology. These “fourth largest” reserves would catapult Pakistan from energy import to export, rewriting the region’s geo-economics.
Mr Bhattacharya admires “Pakistan’s astonishing ability to dance on the diplomatic tightrope — undaunted, unbowed, and, for now, undefeated”.
