China’s Perspective on the 80th Anniversary of the End of World War II and the Founding of the United Nations

On this 80th anniversary, two milestones converge: the victory of the World Anti-Fascist War (World War II) and the birth of the United Nations (UN). For China, these are not separate commemorations. The end of the war in Asia-formally marked with Japan’s Instrument of Surrender on September 2, 1945, and observed in China as Victory Day on September 3-paved the way for a UN designed to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” China’s story runs through both: it fought one of the war’s longest and bloodiest fronts, and it played a founding role in crafting a postwar order anchored in international law and sovereign equality.

China’s wartime sacrifice and global contribution

China’s War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression (1931-1945) was integral to the global anti-fascist struggle. Chinese fronts tied down large numbers of Japanese forces, shaping the balance of power across the Pacific and European theaters. The human cost was staggering-Chinese sources estimate more than 35 million military and civilian casualties-cementing a national memory that regards peace as the ultimate strategic good.

This historical experience explains why Chinese leaders consistently frame wartime remembrance as a normative commitment: “preventing the historical tragedy from happening again” is the best way to honor the fallen. That message-prominent at earlier victory anniversaries-links remembrance with a forward-looking agenda of mutual respect, non-aggression, and common development.

From San Francisco to New York: China at the creation of the UN

The UN Charter was signed on June 26, 1945, in San Francisco and entered into force on October 24 that year. China’s delegation-honoring its long resistance and status as one of the “Big Four”-was accorded the distinction of being the first to sign the Charter, a symbolic gesture that underscored both sacrifice and responsibility. Today the UN recognizes China as a founding member and one of the five permanent members of the Security Council

This founding role remained continuous even as representation at the UN shifted in 1971 from the Chiang Kai-shek clique to the People’s Republic of China through General Assembly Resolution 2758, which “restored all its rights” to the PRC and recognized it as “the only legitimate representative of China.” The decision has structured UN politics-and debates around representation-ever since.

Eight decades on: China’s evolving footprint in multilateralism

1) Peacekeeping and security

China describes itself as a “staunch supporter” of UN peacekeeping and multilateral security. In practice, that has meant three pillars:

” Finance. China is the second-largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping. The approved UN peacekeeping budget for July 2024-June 2025 is about $5.6 billion, to which China bears an assessed share second only to the United States.

” Personnel. China is the largest troop and police contributor among the Security Council’s permanent members, and in recent years has ranked around the global top ten by personnel-about 2,200-2,300 deployed-illustrating a shift from non-involvement to operational engagement.

” Capacity-building. Beijing helped establish the UN Peace and Development Trust Fund in 2016, pledging $200 million over ten years to support UN work in peace and security and the 2030 Agenda.

These steps track a broader security discourse that China advances-the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and, more recently, the Global Security Initiative-both framed as aligning with the UN Charter’s emphasis on sovereignty, dialogue, and non-interference.

2) Development first: SDGs, GDI and BRI

China’s development diplomacy has been explicitly linked to UN frameworks:

” Global Development Initiative (GDI). Announced in 2021, the GDI positions the UN as a key partner and calls for “results-oriented” projects to accelerate all 17 SDGs-especially in poverty alleviation, food and energy security, and resilient supply chains. A UN partnerships page describes the GDI as a vehicle to “revitalize” progress toward the 2030 Agenda.

” BRI-SDGs alignment. UN agencies and studies have documented complementarities between the Belt and Road Initiative and the SDGs, and UNDP has formal cooperation with China in this area. The thrust is that infrastructure and connectivity-if green and transparent-can advance development targets.

3) Climate and global public goods

At UN fora, China has pledged to peak CO? emissions before 2030 and reach carbon neutrality before 2060, a commitment repeatedly referenced in UN climate submissions. Independent trackers and recent analyses suggest peaking could occur earlier if current clean-energy trends continue-an outcome with global significance for 2030-2035 targets now under discussion.

The reform debate at 80: representation, effectiveness, and equity

With the UN turning 80, reform is again on the agenda. China’s stated position emphasizes three points:

1. Greater voice for the Global South, especially Africa. Beijing argues that Security Council reform should “redress the historical injustices done to Africa” and increase developing-country representation. It endorses “special arrangements” to realize Africa’s aspirations-part of a broader call for fairer global governance.

2. Effectiveness without politicization. China links reform to stronger delivery on peace, development finance, and public goods, while warning against unilateral coercive measures it sees as inconsistent with the Charter.

3. UN-centered multilateralism. In speeches marking UN anniversaries, Chinese leaders locate initiatives like the GDI within a UN-anchored system, holding up the Charter’s purposes and principles as the core “rules of the road.”

These positions are not uncontested; analysts debate how far Beijing will go in backing specific African reform proposals or how its preferences shape agency agendas. But the through-line is clear: China wants a stronger UN that is more representative of developing countries and more tightly aligned to the Charter’s sovereignty norms.

What China asks of the UN-eight decades on

1. Honor the Charter in both letter and spirit. For China, the Charter’s purposes-sovereign equality, non-intervention, peaceful settlement of disputes-are not just legal text; they are lessons paid for in blood.

2. Put development at the center. Without development, there is no durable peace. That logic underpins the GDI, South-South cooperation, and BRI-SDG cooperation frameworks.

3. Strengthen peacekeeping while preventing conflict. Sustain financing, modernize mandates, and invest in prevention-areas where China points to its assessed contributions, personnel deployments, and the Peace and Development Trust Fund.

4. Green transition as a shared task. Meeting peaking and neutrality timelines is both a domestic transformation and a global public good; China frames its clean-energy surge as a contribution to the UN climate regime.

5. Reform for legitimacy. Expand representation-especially for Africa-so the UN reflects 21st-century demographics and power realities while preserving its capacity to act.

A China-UN compact for the next 80 years

If the first 80 years were about preventing a return to great-power war and managing decolonization, the next 80 will be about making multilateralism deliver amid systemic stresses-climate risk, technological disruption, inequality, and renewed geopolitics. China’s wager is that UN-centered cooperation, development-led security, and shared-future thinking can move the world from zero-sum rivalry toward pragmatic problem-solving. That wager is backed by resources (peacekeeping finance, trust funds), deployments (personnel on the ground), and policy frames (GDI, BRI-SDG synergies, climate milestones).

For audiences in Pakistan and across the Global South, the message resonates: the institutions born in 1945 will only stay legitimate if they deliver development, uphold sovereignty, and include the voices of those who make up most of humanity. The 80th anniversary is therefore not only a look back at victory over fascism or a commemoration of signatures in San Francisco. It is an invitation-China would say an obligation-to make the UN’s second 80 years more representative, more effective, and more just than its first.