East Asia and Beijing’s silent offensive

China has been the largest trading partner of ASEAN for more than a decade now. This is not simply an economic interdependence; but the relations go beyond the traditional equation to incorporate the evolving yet important domain of foreign policy: international public diplomacy. In this regard, soft power (the non-coercive, persuasive, and attractive ways of dealing with a particular actor instead of using kinetic force) plays a very important role.

China uses different tools to achieve its goals. For instance, educational exchange programs, Confucius institutions, fully funded scholarships, and media narrative equally contribute to molding the public opinion in ASEAN regarding different regional and international issues concerning Beijing. Particularly, after the operationalization of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, coupled with Beijing’s post COVID-19 bilateral engagements, the circumstances have shifted in China’s favor despite the evolving competition in the region (i.e. Tokyo’s FOIP, Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy, and New Delhi’s Look East Policy).

However, this approach involves the elements of strategic coercion which have serious repercussions at the regional as well as international level.

There are multiple ways and tools China strategically utilize when it comes to promoting the positive image of Beijing. For instance, with the annual budget of more than $10 billion, China operates 41 Confucius Institutions (CI) in ASEAN alone. These institutions have been active to foster civilizational and cultural ties in the host nations. From 2006 to 2021, CI organized more than 2,000 events to promote Chinese language, history, art, and civilization.

Moreover, student exchange programs and scholarships are also a strategic pillar in China’s soft power. For instance, more than 30% students in the Chinese academic institutions hail from the foreign countries. They not only bring back their degrees but also become Beijing’s cultural ambassadors, propagating technological and the academic excellence of China.

The other tool is China’s state-sponsored media networks that operate across ASEAN. These help Beijing presents its state approved messages to counter the historically dominated Western perception regarding China. In this realm, framing a particular issue in a certain way, extensive coverage of the events related to China and ASEAN, and the exclusive Op-Eds by the Beijing funded think-tanks, scholars, and organizations serve the purpose. Multiple independent surveys shows that it helped China mold the public perception about Beijing in a positive manner, especially in the states that have territorial or maritime disputes with China i.e. Vietnam.

The public perception in ASEAN about China varies from state to state, depending upon the strength of its bilateral relations; states with little emphasis on the China’s assertion in the South China Sea (i.e. Brunei, Timor-Leste) focus on the areas of common interests such as digital governance, non-traditional maritime security threats, and industrial capacity buildup. In these states, the public perception is usually positive about China. As a survey by ISEAS shows, 37.5% ASEAN population view China as an important strategic, economic, and civilizational power (a significant jump from the previous 24.8%).

But, on the other hand, states with direct threats from Beijing, adopt strategic ambiguity in their dealings with China (both in bilateral ties, and under the ASEAN forums). However, after the initiation of BRI, there appear two trends: states with already good relations with Beijing witnessed the overall positive trajectory (in the surveys regarding public perception about China); while the other states view BRI as a tool of economic coercion as they emphasis more on Beijing’s debt diplomacy over the mutual benefits.

For instance, 53% population in Philippines still views Beijing as a regional hegemony with extra-territorial ambitions. More than 90% of Vietnamese still have sovereignty concerns with China. The BRI projection contributed negatively (given the case of Sri Lanka) instead of improving the public trust on China in these states. However, in Laos, Indonesia, and Malaysia, the 20% increase is observed owing to their already positive ties with Beijing.

There also exist grey areas as mixed trends appear in some states due to the geopolitical proximities concerning ASEAN. For reference, due to threat of Trump’s tariffs on ASEAN and the Charm Offensive of Xi, public perception about China increases significantly in Manila which was conscious earlier. However, these states can be seen as a swing state of ASEAN with no permanent public opinion regarding China.

Over the years, China successfully projected itself as the champion of the Global South, Multipolarity, and non-interference principle. One the one hand, it helped Beijing gain a significant influence across the public sphere in ASEAN. For instance, with ASEAN-China free trade agreement, participation in ASEAN+3, and narrative manipulation, China created its positive image; on the other hand, its code of conduct with the weaker states in the region such as Taiwan, and Philippines showcase that Beijing is not yet ready to take the lead.

This dichotomy resulted in dividing states based on nature (positive or negative) of their bilateral ties with China, instead of depending upon ASEAN’s overall strategy towards China. For reference, positive public perception of China in Timor-Leste, Indonesia, and Malaysia compelled the states from adopting the U.S. led anti-China measures. In that way, ASEAN’s foreign policy on the key issues such as that of 9 dash line got fragmented as collective decision in ASEAN’s framework involves unanimous consensus among the member states.

In conclusion, one can say that China uses its soft power for dual purpose: promoting its positive image alongside using it for the coercive purpose to dismantle the notion of ASEAN’s centrality. But it has strategic implications for the regional and global scale.