Is China unhappy, if not annoyed, with Kabul’s position on groups that it considers detrimental to the interests of the entire region? Does China’s interest in Afghanistan limited to counter-terrorism (CT) only or extends beyond CT? How does its positioning vis a vis the “ETIM threat” define Beijing’s South Asia policy? For how long can the Afghan Taliban expect largess while staying indifferent, if not insensitive, to concerns of friendly countries?
This week took Wang Yi, the Chinese Foreign Minister, to an unusual trip first to India and then to Islamabad and Kabul. The India leg was an attempt to reconnect with a country that basked in glory as the “strategic partner of the US and Europe” until Donald Trump’s reentry into the White House. India’s “darling of the US” also drew both New Delhi and Beijing apart for several years. After enduring slurs from Trump, the Indian leaders have warmed up again to China.
The best outcome of the thaw with New Delhi probably was Indian Foreign Minister Jaishankar’s reiteration that “Taiwan is part of China.” It obviously lent a special flavour to Wang Yi’s re-warming visit — a fence-mending underway.
Though skepticism still surrounds this bonhomie as to whether it will survive after Trump’s exit from the White House in three years from now. And this calls for China to be extremely cautious about the long-term strategic partner of the Western alliances; as a member BRICS and SCO, India may not be a facilitator for these organisations which Donald Trump views as anti-dollar.
We should not, therefore, disregard the deep trust deficit that clouds the thus-far uneasy Sino-India relations too. And that stems from New Delhi’s strategic posturing which smells more like a western geo-strategic potpourri than an organically carved menu. And hence the fog of mistrust which also deepened when the Indian officials issued a clarification on the Taiwan issue and claimed Jaishankar had been misquoted by Chinese officials.
It incensed Beijing, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Mao Ning hoped that India will earnestly abide by the one-China principle. This clearly underlined the devious nature of the Indian diplomacy aimed at not displeasing the US.
The same looks true for Afghanistan too. Despite the immense goodwill it has enjoyed because of its long sufferings, the country’s leadership apparently lacks the trust even of its long-term partners such as China and Pakistan. This, it is evident, turns Afghanistan in to a formidable roadblock in the way of building up relations beyond CT.
During his visit to Kabul on August 20 for bilateral and the sixth round trilateral dialogues, Wang Yi urged the Taliban government to resume joint patrols along the Wakhan Corridor, the narrow 74-kilometre-long strip that links Afghanistan with China’s Xinjiang region. Beijing is concerned about the possible infiltration of Uyghur militants, particularly from the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which it sees as a key terrorist threat.
“China supports the prompt resumption of bilateral patrols in the Wakhan Corridor to maintain peace and stability in the border region,” Wang Yi said during a meeting with the Afghan acting Minister of Interior Affairs, Sirajuddin Haqqani.
While describing Afghanistan as an “indispensable” partner in regional peace and modernisation, the Chinese foreign minister called on the Taliban to step up counterterrorism efforts and not to allow any group to use Afghan soil to threaten China, while emphasising that security cooperation would also enable deeper economic ties.
The absence of a formal joint statement after Wang Yi’s meetings with Afghan officials indicates a troubling reality i.e. Beijing may not be happy with the Afghan Emirate’s position on groups such as TTP and ETIM — constant irritants respectively for Beijing and Islamabad.
A Tolo News report quoted Wais Naseri, an Afghan political analyst, as saying: “Like China, Pakistan is also interested in improving Kabul-Islamabad relations; however, the conditions set by Pakistan are the same as those posed by China to Afghanistan’s current authorities. Therefore, it is necessary to seek solutions to the concerns these countries have about security developments.”
This quote sums up the dilemma that both Pakistan and China face in dealing with Afghanistan’s present rulers. Wais Naseri is essentially urging Kabul to heed requests by friendly countries and act against groups that threaten the security of these two countries.
One would hope that Kabul takes such advice in positive stride. International relations rest on quid pro quo. You cannot expect political and economic support from countries while disregarding their requests about the groups which these countries view as external proxies out to jeopardise internal security and hurt their interests. The Taliban regime, which has brought about considerable stability and peace to their country, should dispel the perception that they are pursuing a cloak and dagger policy.
