This piece attempts to deconstruct the imperatives of Sino-India bilateralism in the backdrop of US-China competition. In my piece, “War of Humiliation” in the South Asia magazine (November 2020), discussing the Sino-Indian escalation in Ladakh, I had concluded that expecting India to stand up to China as a bulwark, that the US continues to prop it, is too far-fetched. That China and India would never — willingly or unwillingly — walk into a full-blown war, that is in nobody’s interest.
If anyone expects India to stand upto to China — doing the US bidding — in a resurrected Great Game 2.0; then it is not knowing India of Chanakya Kautilya (375-283 BC). The wizard, also called Vishnugupta or the Indian Machiavelli, said: “Do not reveal what you have thought of doing… keep it secret being determined to carry it into execution.”
Fast forward to 2025, there is a lot of debate nudging India to be in a ‘partnership alliance’ with the US to counter China; as most analysts in the US/European camp, think India cannot do it alone. Some emphasise that ‘strengthening Quad’ (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue comprising Australia, India, Japan and America) would be a good starting point for New Delhi. Realising that India is a ‘hedging’ middle power, eager to play both if not all sides, the US think-tanks deduce that transfer of more sophisticated and advanced technology to India would depend upon India’s overt anti-Beijing credentials.
The basic premise of such thinking is that a shooting Sino-Indian war is inevitable, and that militarily embroiling China through India is cost effective and makes strategic sense. This is a faulty presumption, just like encouraging Ukraine, a militarily weaker side, to go on the offensive against a militarily stronger Russia that was on the defensive, in the much-touted Ukrainian counter offensive in 2023, that failed.
The recent chasm in the US-India relations emanate from India profiting from the Russian oil imports, debunking sanctions; Indian protectionism in trade against US agricultural products; Modi’s refusal to acknowledge President Trump’s role in the May 2025 Pakistan-India ceasefire; and the less than expected tenacity by India in the cited conflict. However, these are transient factors originating from the ‘Trump Factor’, who is in his last presidential term. There are compelling reasons for Washington to keep India in its orbit and repair the damaged relations, even if New Delhi is not very forthcoming.
First, in the US strategic construct China, Iran, North Korea and Russia make a substantial ‘authoritative scale (mass of alliance power)’ presenting a unified challenge, needing a unified response. Moreover, China under President Xi has moved away from its confrontational ‘wolf warrior’ diplomacy, with emerging profile in the Global South, Africa in particular. Its BRI networks 126 countries through highways, railways, pipelines, power plants, grids, IT, social welfare and poverty-alleviation projects. BRI’s staggering investment of over $1.3 trillion will ultimately cover 60% of the world population and 40% of its GDP, providing a viable economic alternative, catapulting the present US-led predatory economic system.
Second, America’s inability to compete with both China and Russia, requires ‘strategic diplomacy’, some US analysts emphasise. Its core purpose being ‘cultivating favourable balances of power in critical regions’ to project power far beyond material means. Strategic diplomacy aims to limit rival’s options, without seeking to remove the sources of conflict. The US is moving past the age of ‘globalized utopia’, of being the single-most powerful hegemon, enjoying comprehensive security enabled by techno-military capabilities. It gravitates towards alliance partnerships and strategic diplomacy. And under its ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy, building the largest anti-China coalition, India stands out to bridge the gap between Washington’s rhetoric and capabilities.
US analysts feel Biden Administration was unable to properly cultivate New Delhi against Beijing. They feel Trump should nudge India closer ‘as an ally on the level of Japan or NATO partners’.
Will India do the US bidding willingly, under coercion or under inducements? The straight answer is no, under any conditions. Way back in a meeting with the US officials, when asked to analyse the US-India potential relationship, my answer was to ‘go ahead and find out’. However, much that India will drag its feet on becoming involved in bloc politics, alliance partnership with the US, and ignore its ‘strategic autonomy’, Washington will persistently deploy the pressure-inducement combo to rope in New Delhi against China. Even if that means making India, as some suggest, a regional policeman and hegemon in South Asia, deferring to its advice and actions concerning other countries like Pakistan. The other touted US ‘deputy sheriffs’ to include Australia in Pacific Islands, Vietnam in continental Southeast Asia and Nigeria in Africa.
Expecting India to go against one of its largest trading partners (despite an otherwise obscure border conflict), is not understanding geo-economics and history. First, Sino-India annual trade is over $100 for the third consecutive year. It was $124 billion for FY2024. Second, India has historically conceded against formidable adversaries, from Afghans to Moghuls to Portuguese to the British. That historic constant has not changed, Modi or no Modi. Third, militarily, Indian discussions concede China’s conventional and nuclear advantage. India responds to this “conventional asymmetry” through infrastructural build-up, force modernisation and new raisings, compared to Beijing’s better military infrastructure, capabilities, and logistics.
The Indian security establishment remains concerned about greater survivability of Indian forces on the battlefield, in an environment of uncontrolled escalation, instead of investing in new weapon platforms especially the nuclear ones. However, paradoxically, the cited asymmetry also serves as a strong catalyst for peaceful co-existence.
It is, therefore, no surprise that India gravitates towards better relations with Beijing under its ‘Look East Policy’, burnished by the recent chasm with Washington. When China’s Foreign Minister, Wang Yi on August 18, 2025, during his two-day visit to New Delhi emphasised both nations to view each other as ‘partners’ and not ‘adversaries or threats’; his Indian counterpart Jaishankar acknowledged the Chinese overtures, saying both countries were seeking to ‘move ahead from a difficult period in our relations’. Wang met Premier Modi on Tuesday, reaffirming ‘positive trend’ in the bilateral ties.
In sum, India it too smart to fall for the US trap.
