Are we in for a radical change in Pak-Afghan relations after an unprecedented move by proponents of the former Northern Alliance, many of whom now embody the National Resistance Front (NRF) of Afghanistan, led by Ahmed Masood, the son of the late Ahmed Shah Masood? Or does a rude shock await the new Kabul regime through new alignments involving Tajikistan, the historical base of the Northern Alliance?
But before delving into the Pak-Afghan issue, let’s look at three critical developments in the current “world in flux”. President Donald Trump’s peace and tariffs offensives are indeed enforcing recalibration, if not major shifts, in global alliances.
Trump’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin — regardless of immediate outcomes — marks a defining moment both for their bilateral relations and the present turbulent geopolitics.
Secondly, after China’s upfront posturing on the tariffs issue forced Trump into extending the deadline for trade negotiations, Indian business executives and Prime Minister Narendra Modi are slowly upping the India card with their anti-America rhetoric. This is triggering calls across India for boycotting McDonald’s, Coca-Cola, Amazon and Apple, among others — all prompted by US tariffs on exports from India, which is the biggest market for Meta’s WhatsApp and beverages like Pepsi, Coca-Cola or Starbucks.
India, being the world’s most populous country and the fourth largest economy, certainly sees value in leveraging its soft power vis-à-vis a strident Trump, not ready to bend – at least for now.
Thirdly, and it relates to the messaging, Trump’s policies on tariffs and conflict are radiating with a “sobering” effect on the smaller and weaker stakeholders across the globe.
And one wonders if the Independence Day felicitations from the traditionally pro-India and anti-Taliban NRF, a successor to the Northern Alliance, also flow from President Trump’s indirect messaging.
The unprecedented NRF message (congratulations to Pakistan and its people on the occasion of the country’s Independence Day) comes in the context of an argument that present Taliban government leaders often peddle in private; Northern Afghan groups would brand us as “pro-Pakistan if we shunned the historical Afghan position on the border issue.”
It is worth recalling that when the US launched its bombing of Kabul on October 7, 2001, in the aftermath of the 9/11 terror attacks in New York and Washington, their partner on the ground was Masood’s Shoorae Nazar, then led by Marshal Faheem. Masood had been assassinated by Al-Qaeda militants disguised as journalists in his native Takhar province only two days before the 9/11 attacks. The entire politics of Shoorae Nazar was anti-Pakistan, pro-India, and they had always leveled allegations that sounded like coming from India. Most of their leaders lived in India before and after the 9/11 attacks. Even Masood Khalili, who was injured in the attack on Ahmed Shah Masood, was taken to India for treatment.
It is nothing but ironic that following decades of acrimonious posturing, the successor to Shoorae Nazar — NRF — has extended an olive branch to Islamabad through an encouraging Independence Day message.
Now that the late Ahmed Shah Masood’s son has formally congratulated Pakistan, Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi also sent similar greetings to his Pakistani counterpart, Ishaq Dar, according to an official announcement from Muttaqi’s office.
The exchange of greetings also coincided with the celebration of “Victory Day” — when the Taliban regained power in Afghanistan on a Sunday, August 15, four years ago.
Does the festive mood – a mix of hope and goodwill — around Pakistan’s Independence Day, Afghanistan’s “Victory Day”, followed by the Afghan Independence Day on August 19 coupled with positive messaging from the NRF offer a chance to Afghans in general and to the Taliban regime in particular to build on their expression of goodwill for Pakistan? Can the development help Afghans embrace the reality of Pakistan as it has existed since 1947, abandon the old clichéd narratives that often belittle and accuse it of treating Afghanistan as a colony, and move on in favour of an equal-footed cordial relationship between the two uneasy neighbouring countries?
Have the winds of change begun blowing to improve Pak-Afghan relations, or should the NRF felicitation gesture signal something ominous to Pakistan, particularly at a time when both China and Russia have courted the Taliban leadership, with Moscow recognising the Kabul regime to the displeasure of the Trump administration? How would Taliban leaders view the recently concluded Pakistan-Tajikistan Counter-Terrorism Exercises Dosti-ll (August 4-9) in a country that historically served as the base for Shoorae Nazar during the anti-Soviet jihad? Dushanbe, the capital, also symbolised the shelter and support (including from India) to Ahmed Shah Masood’s militia in its fight against the Taliban until the 9/11 events, and continues to be the hub of NRF activities.
